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Turning to the determination of the existence of another
adequate remedy for the appellees, it seems that this was clearly
a question for the court which had not been previously determined.
The court reached a result which this writer believes it can justify;
however, it seems reasonable to say that the court might have
reached the opposite result and justified it by an expansion and
more thorough examination of the appellee's argument that the
statutory remedy was not adequate for this situation.
In the case of Whited v. Fugate, supra, we seem to have a
clear case for the application of a writ of mandamus. Here the
court said: "For the reasons stated in the case of Hall v. Stuart,
supra, . . . the petition . . . for a mandamus should have been
granted," and with no further discussion granted the mandamus.
This would certainly lead one to believe that the court is implying
that here is a "clear" situation for the application of mandamus.
These two cases seem to help clarify the court's position on the
granting of mandamus. The first case seemed to come close to
justifying a need for mandamus, but the argument for it was not
strong enough for the Supreme Court. The second case presented
a need, sufficiently strong, to have the court grant the writ.
T. H.F.
PROCEDURE-RULE 3:21
In a recent case,' the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has
interpreted for the first time Rule 3:21 of the Rules of Court. The
interpretation made by the Court was one of a most restrictive
nature and, judging from the facts of the case, may have thwarted
justice. It is true that the Rule was given a definitive interpretation,
but the binding analysis, as fixed by the Court, was not warranted
in the face of the liberal policy which is the trend in this country
whenever procedural problems are involved. Rather than proceed
under this modem view, the highest Court in Virginia has chosen
instead to remain with the conservative element.
In the present case, which arose from an automobile accident,
the final judgment was pronounced and entered on March 17,
'Harvey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 198 Va. 213, 93 S.E.2d
309 (1956).
1955. On April 7, 1955, which was the twenty-first day after the
entry of final judgment and within the twenty-one day period as
computed by the statutory provision, 2 the plaintiff filed with the
clerk of court a paper designated by him to be a motion to set
aside the verdict. The grounds for such a motion were that a wit-
ness who was summoned, but not called, had made improper re-
marks to members of the jury. On the same day the defendant
was notified that the plaintiff would present the motion to the
court on April 11, 1955, which was twenty-five days after the entry
of judgment. An affidavit was lodged with the clerk on May 4,
1955. The trial court overruled the motion on June 29, 1955, stat-
ing that it had not been made timely. The plaintiff noted an ex-
ception to the adverse ruling and entered a notice of appeal and
assignment of error on July 7, 1955, which was eighty-two days
after the entry of final judgment.
In deciding this point, the Court ruled that the purpose of
Rule 3:21' was the same as that of Section 17-31,4 whose purpose
was, namely, to expedite final determination of all litigation. The
statute did not contemplate the mere filing of a paper with the
clerk to have the effect of extending the time prescribed; therefore,
the Rule did not. After the final judgment is entered, only the trial
court, by proper order entered within the twenty-one day period, is
authorized to change it. As the clerk's only duty is to receive legal
papers and note thereon the time of receipt, he has no authority
to extend the time period.
To reach its decision on this point, the Court relied heavily on
Bridges v. Commonwealth which interpreted the now obsolete
statute. It reaffirmed its finding in that case wherein it was held
that when a final judgment has been entered, the trial court loses
all jurisdiction and power to reopen and change the order unless
it, in its discretion and with reasonable language used within the
2 Va. Code §1-13(3) (1950).
3 Rules of Court 1950. Rule 3:21 provides that all final judgments remain
under the control of the trial court and are subject to be modified or
vacated for twenty-one days after the date of entry and no longer.
4 Va. Code §17-31 (1950) provides that all judgments or decrees en-
tered during any term of court shall become final at the end of the term
or at the expiration of fifteen days after their rendition, whichever
shall first happen.
5 190 Va. 691, 58 S.E.2d 8 (1950).
prescribed period, undertakes further to consider and adjudicate
the matters decided.
It is the contention of this writer that the strict interpretation
placed upon the Rule is unwarranted because of the apparent dif-
ferences between it and the previous statute. The purpose of the
Rule is to give the trial court greater freedom, even after the judg-
ment becomes final, to rectify any mistake that has been made if
found within the allowed period. The purpose of the statute, as
announced by the Court, was to bring to a swift conclusion all
litigation. Even so there was a period between the entry of the
judgment and the time that it became final in which the trial
court could operate to modify or vacate its judgment. There is no
mention in the statute of any discretionary power placed on the
trial court to change a judgment once entered. The Supreme Court,
however, interpreted the statute liberally as being within the con-
templation of the legislature to allow discretionary action.
As interpreted in this case, there is no mention of any limita-
tion nor any boundary placed upon the trial court to guide it in
the granting or refusing of the motion. From the language of the
Court, it is arguable that the entire matter is absolute. The only
alternative in such a situation as this is for a new trial as prescribed
by statute.6 This would involve costly litigation as well as adding
another case to the already overcrowded docket. The better result
would be to have a summary proceeding as is provided for in other
jurisdictions.
To prevent this problem from arising again, it is advocated
by this writer that an amendment be added to the Rules of Court.
This amendment should allow broad discretion in the trial court,
but its power should be restricted in such a manner that an ag-
grieved party may institute a motion to have the verdict set aside
on certain enumerated grounds.
As an illustration of the type of Rule that should be adopted,
it is recommended that the Federal Rule 7 be used as a model. For
the following reasons, the procedure used in that system allows a
motion by the aggrieved party for relief: (1) mistake, inadvertance,
surprise, excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
6 Va. Code §8-352 (1950).
7Rule 60(b), 28 U.S.C. (1952).
by the exercise of due diligence could not have been discovered
previously; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; (6) any other reason
justifying relief. The evidence which must be produced at the
hearing would have to be more than cumulative. Its nature must
be such that if it had been produced at the trial, the outcome
would have been materially altered. The motion must be made
within a reasonable time but in no event should it exceed a period
of one year from the entry of the final judgment.
The adoption of such an amendment would in no way affect
the finality of the judgment nor suspend its operation. If the mo-
tion were sustained, the money paid to the plaintiff in satisfaction
of this judgment would be held in trust for the moving defendant.
The effect of such a rule would be to place before the trial court
matters which, if they had been presented at the original trial,
could possibly have produced a different verdict. The purpose of
such a rule would be to prevent recurrence of the situation which
presented itself in the Harvey case. If this recommendation is en-
acted, it would become an easy matter in proper cases to get be-
fore the trial court where exceptions could be taken. With this
rule, the absolute discretion now vested in the trial court could be
reviewed by the highest court in the Commonwealth and would
provide another liberal and forward moving step in the overall
trial procedure.
J.E.M.
RECORDATION OF DEED OF TRUST AS
INQUIRY NOTICE
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Chavis v. Gibbs'
has been able to delineate its definition of notice in respect to pur-
chasers of property under the requirements of the Virginia Re-
cording Act.2
1 198 Va. 379, 94 S.E. 2d. 195 (1956).
2 Va. Code §55-96 (1950), which states: "Every such contract in writing,
and every deed conveying any such estate or term, . . ., when the
possession is allowed to remain with the grantor, shall be void as to
all purchasers, for valuable consideration without notice not parties
thereto and lien creditors, until and except from the time it is duly
admitted to record ..... , but the mere possession of real estate shall
not of itself constitute notice to purchasers thereof for value of any
interest or estate therein of the person in possession [Emphasis added] ."
